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Resume:  
In this paper, we will start by analysing the dependency relationship between Portugal 
and the US and Brazil in terms of programming. This will be followed by an 
examination of the main reasons why the EU policies and productions have been quite 
irrelevant to the Portuguese broadcasting scenario. And, finally, we will argue that - 
despite the increasing external links and EU legislation - very concrete national 
decisions (or deliberate non-decisions) taken by national politicians under pressure from 
nationally-based lobbies lay behind the present configuration of Portuguese television 
system.  
 
 
Portuguese Television Policy in the International Context: 
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Paper delivered to the Political Economy Section of the 20th Scientific Conference of 
the International Association for Mass Communication Research, Sydney, Australia, 
17-22 August 1996 
Although Portugal joined the 'democratic club' in the mid-1970's, its television 
policy has been until recently almost exclusively concerned with the control of political 
output. Merely concerned with political content, the executive power did little more 
than look for the adequate appointees to secure full coverage of the government 
achievements and to ensure that politically damaging material was omitted in the news 
bulletins of the sole national television company, Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa (RTP). In 
the 1980's, and for internal and external reasons, it became increasingly evident that the 
RTP's monopoly was no longer sustainable, and in the early 1990's two national TV 
licenses were attributed: one to Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (SIC) and 
another one to Televisão Independente (TVI). 
 The two new television companies soon developed their own international 
linkages, specially with the US and Brazilian programming markets. Depending almost 
exclusively on very limited advertising revenues, the three companies (RTP has two 
channels: Canal 1 and TV2) could hardly afford home/national production and based 
their peak time programming on cheap US and Brazilian fiction (e.g. movies and 
telenovelas) and on foreign formats (e.g. reality shows and quiz shows). Clearly, there is 
an intimate relationship between the broken up of the public television (RTP) monopoly 
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and the intensification of external links between the broadcasting actors and foreign 
markets and organisations. The opening up of the Portuguese television market has 
however been far more favourable to trans-Atlantic actors than to EU member-states 
and EU companies. In fact, so far the EU has had very limited influence over the 
definition of Portuguese broadcasting policy and Portuguese broadcasting companies 
are still far more interested on US and Brazilian productions than European ones. 
In this paper, we will start by analysing the dependency relationship between 
Portugal and the US and Brazil in terms of programming. This will be followed by an 
examination of the main reasons why the EU policies and productions have been quite 
irrelevant to the Portuguese broadcasting scenario. And, finally, we will argue that - 
despite the increasing external links and EU legislation - very concrete national 
decisions (or deliberate non-decisions) taken by national politicians under pressure from 
nationally-based lobbies lay behind the present configuration of Portuguese television 
system.  
 
Dependency and 'Reverse' Dependency 
 
Broadcasting in Portugal has been very much related to electoral politics and - 
as such - it has been perceived as a dangerous political instrument, if not properly 
(though covertly) controlled. Contrary to the telecommunications sector, which has 
been generously financed by recent governments, broadcasting has been financially 
stretched to the limit. The opening up of two private channels in 1992/93, coupled with 
the abolition of the license fee for electoral reasons, compelled four national TV 
channels to fiercely compete for a small advertising cake (around £160m). Both so-
called public service and commercial channels have no resources for quality 
programming and substantial investments in national production are out of question. 
Had not the national television policies been so poorly developed, alternative ways of 
financing would have had to be found and broadcasters would have had to be legally 
obliged to raise their standards.  
Although - as we will demonstrate - the national broadcasting systems operates 
quite independently from EU influence and pressures, the programming output is 
clearly dependent on American and Brazilian cheap imports. The US is the main 
supplier of fictional content, providing 41% of all fiction programmes transmitted on 
Portuguese television whilst Brazil is the second most important supplier (25%) largely 
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due to the soap opera genre (Traquina, 1995i). With the exception of the UK, the EU 
countries have not been successful in exporting their audio-visual products to Portugal 
and national production is not relevant. Prime time television in Portugal is dominated 
by Brazilian soap operas, reality shows and quiz shows (mainly adopting foreign 
formats), and US movies. 
Authors such as Galtung (1971) and Wallerstein (1974; 1979) used structural 
models to analyse the dependency relationship between the core and the periphery, 
between the West and its former colonies. Dependency authors did not see this 
unfavourable relationship only in economic terms (although it was the main focus); they 
have dedicated a considerable part of their work to political, military and cultural 
spheres. In all these areas, the peripheries would be trapped by the interests of the centre 
(or the centre within the centre) which would prevent the peripheries from freeing 
themselves from this vicious cycle. The state of Portuguese broadcasting does indeed 
suggest that all TV channels depend on cheap imports to survive because they cannot 
afford national production which is far more expensive and cannot a priori  guarantee 
large audiences. If Brazil was not a major exporter of television products to Portugal, 
dependency theory would - in this particular case - appear as a more coherent discourse. 
However, dependency theorists have never put forward a framework which could 
explain how Brazil, a former Portuguese colony (and therefore part of the periphery in 
the dependency model), would end up as a major player in the Portuguese broadcasting 
sector. The relationship between Portugal and Brazil in the broadcasting sector is a case 
of 'reverse' dependency. Brazil being the centre and Portugal the periphery. 
Though dependency, imperialism and cultural imperialism (for a critique on the 
latter see Tomlinson, 1991) still describe some relevant economic, political and 
cultural/media aspects in the 'world system' (to use the wording of the dependency 
paradigm),  this body of literature does not stand up to close scrutiny.  The major 
weaknesses of these perspectives are related to the fact that, being global and non-
distinctive, they do not look at the political and economic forces within the countries. 
Ignoring the countries' history and politics, dependency theorists tried to explain too 
much with too little. The cultural imperialist thesis tell us that indigenous cultures are 
invaded by foreign ones (mainly the US) which has generally a negative impact on the 
cultural autonomy of the recipient countries. Cultural imperialists have described the 
media flows and have alerted us to the dangers of 'cultural synchronisation' but they 
have not managed to provide adequate answers as to the root causes of this cultural 
dependency. 
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The cultural industries approach, resulting largely from the work of Garnham 
(1990), Collins et al. (1987) and Locksley (1989), has been far more useful in 
demonstrating why countries such as the US (and indeed Brazil) have competitive 
advantage in the programming production industry and why recipient countries do not 
fight back in an attempt to resist cultural homogenisation. Within a broader political 
economy perspective, these authors do not see the asymmetric flow of cultural products 
as a pre-designed ideological imposition but rather as a consequence of the capital logic 
of cultural production. 
According to Collins et al., the broadcasting commodityii is fundamentally 
different from other non-cultural goods. The essential quality from which it derives its 
value is immaterial/symbolic and as such it is not destroyed by the act of consumption 
(1987:6-8). Unlike manufacturing industries, in programming production almost all 
costs are prototype costs. Each programme is indeed a new (high risk) product 
(Locksley, 1988). The costs of reproduction and distribution are comparatively very 
low. 'This means that there are exceptionally high returns to economies of scale leading 
to a constant push towards audience maximisation' (Garnham, 1990:122). In addition, 
because of what became known as Baumol's diseaseiii, the costs of the broadcasting 
prototypes - which are inherently labour intensive - have been rising steadily. 
In these circumstances, neither the US nor Brazil have to impose their products 
on countries such as Portugal. 'The risks of cultural production can only be lowered to 
an acceptable level by a high and sustained level of investment in a whole production 
programme' (Garnham, 1990:122). The Portuguese broadcasting system cannot afford a 
sustained level of investment and has no production programme. Both the US and 
Brazil have an important competitive advantage: they have huge domestic markets 
which enable their companies to recoup investments within the country. So, 
broadcasting products can be sold in the international market at marginal costs (no anti-
dumpingiv legislation has been used so far). Once these programmes are very cheap, it is 
economically more rational for the Portuguese broadcasting companies to buy their 
products in the international market rather than make their own investments in 'home' 
productions. 
The cultural industries approach has relevant aspects for the Portuguese 
broadcasting scenario. It partly explains why broadcasting companies do not invest in 
national productions. However, the lack of investment in national production and the 
systematic acquisition of cheap poor quality imports is only possible because television 
policy was so crudely developed by the national authorities. In addition to being 
asphyxiated by financial constraints, both public service and commercial television have 
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no effective legal restraints and, consequently, programming is unconditionally 
designed to maximise audiences. Politicians have been almost exclusively concerned 
with political output and were not concerned with the consequences of the generalist TV 
legal framework for programming in general. 
 
The Irrelevance of EU Policies 
 
 Despite the EU's attempts to develop a more comprehensive policy for the 
broadcasting sector, its difficulties have been notorious. In the 1980's, the Commission 
started arguing that broadcasting was a tele-service and, as such, essential to the 
development of an integrated economic market. Therefore, the EU actions in the 
broadcasting sector had to be undertaken either as strictly economic measures which are 
permitted under the EEC Treaty or by using the Commission's spending powers in 
programmes such as MEDIA 92 and MEDIA 95. As in the telecommunications sector, 
the EU rationale to intervene in yet another policy area was related to competitiveness 
(if nothing is done, the argument goes, Europe will be dominated by US programming 
imports) but the political and ideological resistance from member states was far more 
ferocious. 
Since the early 1980's, the EU had taken some initiatives concerning the 
broadcasting sector but the real milestone in the EU's intervention in the sector was the 
1984 Green Paper directed to the establishment of a single broadcasting market in the 
Community (COM (84) 300). This document, known as Television without frontiers, 
defended the free flow of TV programmes as, indeed, any other service or good. The 
subsequent directive, adopted five years later, established a free flow of programmes, 
removing national regulatory obstacles to the free market. Although various issues were 
covered by this directive, namely advertising, sponsorship and moral welfare of 
children, a minimalist approach was taken and member states have ample room to 
develop their own detailed legislation. The most controversial issues such as quotas for 
European-made programmes were, at the time, effectively neutralised. Countries should 
comply with EU orientations 'whenever practicable'. To sum up, the most relevant 
outcome from this directive is that EU governments cannot impede external broadcasts 
or prevent the free circulation of broadcasting products. This final directive represents a 
victory for the EU's most liberal forces. 
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However modest, the dirigistes (mainly DGX) also had a victory with the 
MEDIA programme. Contrary to most Commission's broadcasting initiatives, this 
programme concentrated on content and aimed at counterbalancing the impact of an 
open market for broadcasting production. MEDIA's numerous sub-programmes (e.g. 
Scale, Babel, Script, Cartoon) are supposed to foster cultural pluralism, though their 
inadequacy to help the audio-visual industries in small European countries is widely 
recognised. 
The Television without frontiers directive is, in fact, so generalist that it does 
not play any role in the definition of Portuguese broadcasting policy. All crucial issues 
relating to broadcasting structure such as the number of TV channels, ownership of 
these channels and means of financing were decided exclusively by the Portuguese 
authorities, taking into account domestic lobbies and domestic political considerations. 
Similarly, in terms of broadcasting content, all ground rules (though crudely developed) 
were set up by national politicians. The opening up of the broadcasting market  - the 
most significant outcome of EU broadcasting policy - is also quite irrelevant for 
Portugal. The broadcasting companies produce little fiction, drama or documentaries. If 
Portugal has hardly nothing to export, an open market is bound to have no relevance. 
Furthermore, with the exception of the UK, national broadcasting companies do little 
business in Europe. They have preferred to buy US and Brazilian fiction instead. As 
quotas have not yet been put in place (though the issue is high on the political agenda), 
the EU plays no significant role here as well. 
Programmes such as MEDIA which were designed to stimulate production and 
increase cultural diversity are having almost no significance for both big and small 
countries. In almost all MEDIA sub-programmes, Portugal is one of the EU countries 
with few projects submitted and approved (see Media Desk, 1993; 1993a; 1994; 1995). 
Between 1989 and 1993, for example, the Script fund has supported two Portuguese 
movies (Media Desk, 1993:5). Between 1991 and 1992, the Documentary sub-
programme has financed one national documentary (Media Desk, 1993:9). In 1993, the 
Scale sub-programme, which is specifically designed to stimulate production in small 
European countries has supported four productions (Media Desk, 1993:21). Although 
the financial allocations have not been fully disclosed and it is not clear what they 
represent in the overall budget, it is believed that they are very limited indeed. Because 
the financial rewards are not relevant and difficult to obtain (mainly for bureaucratic 
reasons), national broadcasters have not shown any particular interest in applying to 
these projects. 
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Following the 1994 Audiovisual Green Paper (COM (94) 96), a new MEDIA 
programme was developed and is due to operate from 1996 until 2000 with a proposed 
budget of ECU 400m. MEDIA II (designed to support training and project development 
where there is an European dimension in the market strategy and encourage the 
distribution of the European films) is so far the only concrete outcome of the 1994 
Green Paper. In this consultation document, the Commission analysis identifies four 
fundamental requirements for the future of the European Programme Industry: i) it must 
be competitive in an open, world-wide market; ii) it must be forward-looking and 
involved in the development of the information society; iii) it must illustrate the creative 
genius and the personality of the people of Europe and iv) it must be capable of 
transforming its growth into new jobs in Europe (COM (94) 96). 
The 1994 Green Paper reflects distinct (possibly contradictory) goals. On the 
one hand, it wants to promote economic growth. On the other hand, it implies that 
European culture (whatever it entails) should be defended from cheap American 
imports. Although European culture and identity is often invoked as a rationale for 
public policy, the EU provides no explanation as to what it means. 'The notion of 'unity 
in difference' has been convenient for policy makers. It has enabled them to glide over 
difficult questions' (Collins, 1994:47). Cultural interventionists (mainly within DGX) 
have, in fact, been emphasising that European culture and/or European identity cannot 
be disassociated from national culture and identity, and that it must be protected. Still, 
these preoccupations have had no impact on the development of broadcasting policy in 
Portugal. Issues of national culture and identity have not been addressed by domestic 
politicians (at least since the 1974 revolution) or by other actors in the broadcasting 
arena. 
At the present, the EU is not bringing any benefits to the Portuguese 
broadcasting sector and it might even have perverse effects on the development of a 
national broadcasting/communications policy. National politicians are aware that EU 
binding legislation takes precedence over national legislation and they do not want to be 
challenged by regional decisions. But within the Commission itself there are 
contradictory  interests and a great deal of ambiguity as to who is responsible for what. 
The Competition directorate (DGIV) has no direct responsibility over broadcasting but 
has been successfully exerting influence in this arena. The telecommunications 
directorate (DGXIII) has been very active in terms of satellite and HDTV policies. 
DGX has direct responsibility over broadcasting but is perceived as a weak DG, if 
compared to DGIV and DGXIII. Due to the Commission's internal struggles, 
contradictory signals are thus often sent to the member states and unprepared politicians 
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- unclear about their own views - might think that it is safer to do nothing than to act 
and be challenged later on. 
Precisely because of these uncertainties, the EU has been used by domestic 
interest groups as a testing ground when national actors are not satisfied with 
governments' decisions. For example, the Portuguese private broadcasting company, 
Televisão Independente (TVI), has formally complained to the Competition directorate 
against the state subsidisation of the public service company, Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa 
(RTP). TVI has argued that state subsidies were against EU competition laws. Using EU 
internal contradictions in the broadcasting sector, domestic interest groups are 
attempting to get outside the country the political support they are not getting from 
national authorities. 
In the future, the EU internal contradictions and political ambiguities are bound 
to create even more difficulties in the development of a comprehensive national 
communications policy. National actors which are not pleased with domestic decisions 
will continue to use the EU as a testing ground, in an attempt to benefit from the 
Union's inability to gain consensus in controversial areas. On the one hand, this will 
blur the already fragile national accountability mechanisms as governments can be 
excused by the views of a given Commission DG; on the other hand, democratic 
procedures themselves have been eroded particularly since the Commission has never 
been voted for and most European citizens perceive it as an impenetrable and remote 
institution. In the communications scene the EU is not providing any vision or 
leadership while diminishing the confidence of national governments such as Portugal 
(with lack of experience in the international fora) in developing a more coherent and 
comprehensive national communications policy. 
 
The Opening up of the Television Sector 
 
Although Portugal has had a democratic regime since the mid-1970s, its 
television policy has been until recently almost exclusively concerned with the control 
of political output. Merely concerned with contents, the executive power did little more 
than looking for the adequate appointees to secure coverage of the governments' 
achievements and to guarantee that politically damaging material was suppressed from 
the so-called public service television company, Rádio Televisão Portuguesa (RTP). 
The 1992 break-up of RTP's monopoly was the most meaningful change in the 
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television arena. Indeed, since the early days of television in Portugal, in the 1950's, no 
structural changes had occurred in the relationship between the medium and the 
political power. Direct censorship was abolished after the 1974 coup d'etat but RTP 
remained under the control of successive governments (elected or not). It can therefore 
be argued that a structural change did occur in 1992 because, although new national 
channels were attributed to the safest possible actors, the government of the day lost, for 
the first time, the power to exercise direct influence over the entire television political 
output. 
Although changes in the television system only took place in the early 1990's, 
there had been considerable debate about private/commercial television throughout the 
1980's. The Catholic Church was one of the first actors to openly express its desire to 
own and run a private TV channel but the political and economic conditions were not 
favourable. In the early and mid-1980's, there was political instability and a serious 
economic crisis. The situation would only change after Portugal's accession into the 
European Community in 1986. From 1987 onwards, there was considerable economic 
growth and the social democrats - in power from 1985 until 1995 - brought political 
stability to the country. As the advertising market expanded so others expressed interest. 
Economic groups, such as Balsemão's, Sonae and Presslivre, started to seriously 
evaluate the possibilities in the new context. The opening up of television to private 
initiative was, nevertheless, delayed until the early 1990's as the government (and other 
media actors) had to concentrate their efforts on the re-organisation of the radio sector 
whose expansion had been chaotic since the mid-1980's. When local and regional radio 
frequencies were attributed, political interest moved again to private television. 
With the exception of the Communist Party, all political parties favoured the 
attribution of two TV channels to private operators. Public opinion, in general, was 
favourable to this move mainly because RTP was perceived as being constantly under 
direct and/or indirect governmental control. At that time, any alternative was understood 
as being better than the RTP monopoly. In addition to RTP's lack of credibility, other 
factors played a role in terms of facilitating the break up of the monopoly. Advertisers 
and expected winners of the bidding process argued for the opening up, trying to 
convince politicians and the public that Portugal was once again backwards, losing the 
liberalisation/modernisation bandwagon. Elements of the political and economic elite, 
who already had access to satellite television, were also convinced that more national 
channels would mean more independence from political power and wider choice. The 
opening up to private initiative was perceived as the 'natural' thing to do because most 
European countries had already done it. Cross border ideas were taken as almost 
'universal truths', pre-empting any serious debate on programming strategies and on the 
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economic viability of four national channels. Indeed, no serious discussion took place 
about what kind of commercial exploitation should be associated with private channels. 
The constitutional obstacles towards private television were removed on the 1st 
of June 1989 when the National Assembly approved amendments in the legislative text 
by a two thirds majority. The new text allowed TV channels to be privately owned. The 
next highly controversial step was the drafting of a new television act. Conflicting 
interests were at stake and, once again, the Catholic Church was at the centre of the 
controversy. The Church wanted to be granted a TV channel without participating in the 
bidding process. So, when the government's law proposal was known, the Portuguese 
bishops went publicly against the government saying that 'the law proposal does not 
correspond to former commitments and to what was expected, it does not safeguard the 
Church's rights consigned in the Constitution' (Público, 7 February 1992:5). In the 
1970's, the Church had been granted an assurance by the former prime minister, Sá 
Carneiro, that it would be attributed a television channel. Hence, the religious leaders 
felt they were now being unfairly treated. The Church's Rádio Renascença  network was 
used to put these arguments forward and clerics throughout the country were given the 
task of reading and commenting on the bishops' position. 
In the middle of serious rows and hot debates, on the 13th of July 1990, the 
Parliament approved a new television law which did not contemplate any privileged 
position for the Catholic Church, but it also did not prevent the Church from applying 
for a channel. The law says that 'the activity of television cannot be exercised and 
financed by political parties or associations, unions, professional and employers 
organisations, and by local authorities' (law nº 58/90, Art.3º). Still, significantly, 
religious organisations were not mentioned in this law. 
Once the new television law was passed and the bidding regulations approved, 
on the 2nd of April 1991, three candidates applied for the two available national TV 
channels: the Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (SIC) led by Pinto Balsemão; 
Rede Independente (TV1), chaired by Proença de Carvalho with the support of the 
Carlos Barbosa media group (Presslivre), and Televisão Independente (TVI), close to 
the Catholic Church. The other potential candidate, Sonae group, announced in January 
1991 that it would give up the competition. Sonae is a successful economic groups and 
the predictable lack of advertising revenues certainly contributed to its pulling out. 
Moreover, applying for a TV channel would be an expensive exercise and Sonae's 
chances of winning, whatever the quality of the project, would be very slim indeed. 
Sonae was - at the time - perceived as being close to the Socialist Party (the main 
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opposition party) and the group's newspaper, Público, was often critical of government's 
policies. 
So, only three candidates put forward their projects which the government, 
with the approval of the Alta Autoridade para a Comunicação Social  (AACS), had to 
choose from.  Politicised and without resources and credibility, the AACS  was not 
prepared to give its view on such a sensitive issue. But, as its opinion was required by 
the Constitution, the High Authority decided for 'technical equality' and no candidacy 
was excluded. The TV1 project (Proença de Carvalho) was considered 'deliberately 
ambitious', TVI's (Church) understood as 'modest' and SIC's (Balsemão) as 'balanced'. 
In this context, it was exclusively up to the government to decide on the issue. At that 
stage, the process was totally in control of the prime minister, Cavaco Silva. Although 
in the beginning other senior politicians were involved, when final decisions were to be 
taken, Cavaco Silva managed the process himself. 
On the 6th of February 1992, after a Cabinet meeting, the ministro Marques 
Mendes, announced publicly the results: SIC was attributed the third national channel 
and TVI got the fourth channel. According to Marques Mendes' speech, these decisions 
were taken considering the AACS opinion and four additional criteria: technical quality, 
economic viability, type and characteristics of the programming and the candidates 
ability to satisfy diversity and public interest (Presidência do Conselho de Ministros, 6 
February 1992). But, for the opposition and for TV1 this result was no more than a 
'political decision', taken without transparency. When the decisions were known, the 
editorial of Público newspaper stated: 'The government took the less politically 
damaging decision attributing the two private channels to the Church and to Balsemão' 
(7 February: 3). 
At that time, attention was almost exclusively concentrated on who would gain 
control over the two new TV channels. This is hardly surprising given that - until then - 
the state/government which owned RTP had effective editorial control over the 
company's output. If the same were to happen  with the new TV stations, politicians 
holding office would have to be extremely careful as to who 'deserved' such an useful 
instrument. All other crucial issues associated with the opening up of the market, such 
as sources of financing, balanced programming, national production, were neglected. 
The RTP's license-fee, for example, was abolished by the government before the 
allocation of the new TV channels with no rationale being given for that political 
decision. In what was perceived as a populist move, the social democrat government 
thought to gain political points if voters would not have to pay this 'tax'. 
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Immediate Outcome of the Opening up Process 
 
The Television Law (58/90 of 7 September) was so badly drafted that it is 
totally ineffective and allows TV channels to take the easier option: cheap imports and 
populist programmes. According to this piece of legislation, the generic objectives of 
television - both public and private - are i) to contribute to educate and inform the 
public and to promote cultural values which express the national identity, ii) to 
contribute to the formation of a critical conscience, stimulating creativity and free 
expression, iii) to contribute to the entertainment and education of the public and iv) to 
favour the exchange of ideas between national citizens and foreigners, particularly 
Portuguese language speakers (article 6). These objectives are obviously a dead letter 
because no specific legislation was developed and there are no means to implement 
them. The law does not contemplate any relevant programming requirements. It does 
say that 40% of the broadcasting time 'should' be in Portuguese, of which 30% 'should' 
be of national production and 10% of in-house production (article 19). This is of no 
significance as companies can easily comply with news bulletins, national sports and 
Brazilian soup operas. Other aspects of programming such as European production and 
nationally based independent production are to be observed 'whenever possible'. In fact, 
the Portuguese broadcasting regulatory framework is so vague and generalist that 
companies can literally do what they want in terms of programming strategies. The 
creation of a programme regulator such as, for example, the British Independent 
Television Commission (ITC) was never contemplated. 
With the increasing competition from private operators, RTP's two national 
channels (Canal 1 and TV2) became more populist and less concerned with quality 
programming. Although RTP's journalistic output has traditionally been under 
government control, programming in general has been relatively free from political and 
economic pressures. Aggressive scheduling and fierce fights for audiences are recent 
phenomena, due to the company's need to maintain a substantial share of advertising 
revenue. 
Looking at Canal 1 peak time scheduling it becomes clear that the channel is 
geared towards ratings, neglecting its public service mission, as considered by Blumler 
who argues that the first public service broadcasting (PSB) task is communication for 
citizenship, bearing a sense of responsibility for the health of the political process and 
for the quality of public discussion (1993:404-7). In fact, an analysis of a programming 
week (from the 14th of January to the 20th of January 1995) reveals that nor even one 
documentary or investigative journalism programme was scheduled. The only 
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programme in which there was public discussion was Prova Oral, a live programme on 
which public figures (not necessarily politicians) are interviewed by a former RTP's 
director of Information. Yet, this programme was scheduled at 10.50pm on a week day. 
In general, after the main news bulletins (at 8pm), peak time programmes are 
telenovelas, variety shows, talk shows, quiz games and sports. 
When compared to Canal 1, TV2 appears to be making an effort to adress the 
needs of minority groups and a wider range of television genres is observable. During 
the first two years of competition (1993 and 1994), TV2 reacted as any other 
commercial channel, ignoring its duties as an alternative public service channel. But in 
the programming schedule from the 14th to the 20th of January 1995,  one can notice 
the existence of documentaries like Gente Remota  (Remote People), programmes 
geared to financial consumers (e.g. Dinheiro em Caixa), religious programmes such as 
the Sunday Mass and 70x7, movies and series. Broadly speaking, in this week TV2  
gave space in peak time to so-called high culture programmes such as , theatre, music 
and other art forms. Given that all other national channels show at least four telenovelas  
per day, their absence in TV2 must be recognized. 
Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (SIC), the first commercial channel 
operating in the countryv, has engaged itself in a fierce competition for audiences 
regardless of quality criteria and programming diversity. Fight for audiences and 
publicity has been the rationale of the station, compromising journalistic and fictional 
content. Taking the week from the 14th of January 1995 to the 20th of January 1995, 
SIC put daily on the air five different Brazilian telenovelas from Monday to Friday, two 
on Saturday and one on Sunday. Four daily news bulletins were maintained throughout 
the week. Considerable differences occurred only in the evening schedule, after the fifth 
telenovela. Quizzes and variety shows in Portuguese language, mostly from imported 
formats, were clearly dominant: on Tuesday, Ora Bolas Marina and Labirinto, on 
Wednesday, Perdoa-me, on Thursday, Os Trapalhões and on Friday, Chuva de 
Estrelas, a show dedicated to talent hunting. Overall, SIC broadcasted, in 1994, 49.64% 
of programmes in Portuguese language from which 13% were Globo telenovelas, 7% 
external productions and 29% home productions, including information, sports, 
promotional features, among others (SIC, 1994, unpublished material). SIC has an 
obvious deficit in television genres such as documentaries, programmes of investigative 
journalism and drama. During the week we are considering, only two programmes were 
dedicated to in-depth political interviews, Terça à Noite  and Sete à Sexta. Their own 
documentaries and investigative journalism programmes on the lines of, for example, 
BBC's Panorama  or Channel Four's Dispatches are non-existent. 
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SIC's broadcasting output has been clearly influenced by Globo, Brazil's multi-
media empirevi. Since the very beginning, Globo's managers and personnel have 
provided SIC with both technical know how and strategic expertise. Pinto Balsemão 
says that there is an 'intimate' relationship between Globo and SIC: 'They have given us 
plenty of advice, we tried to follow them and it has been very fruitful' (interview: 
10.01.95). To SIC's chairperson, this privileged relationship is only natural since Globo  
is a share holder and it has a member sitting on SIC's administrative board. Indeed, 
Globo has the maximum of shares allowed by the Portuguese law for a foreign investor 
(15%). Additionally, SIC imports from Globo around £5,200m in telenovelas alone. 
Even if legally Globo cannot acquire a higher percentage of shares, its importance as an 
'adviser' and as an exporter of highly popular products makes it one of the most 
influential share holders in the company. 
Televisão Independente  (TVI) is the second private national TV channel 
operating in Portugalvii. The idea that the Catholic Church could and even should have a 
television station had been cultivated for quite a long time. When the opening up of 
private television was inevitable, few believed that the government would have the 
willingness to confront the church, refusing to grant it a broadcasting license. Being 
described as a television of 'Christian inspiration', TVI is neither a commercial 
television (it was not conceived to make profit) nor a traditional public service 
broadcaster (it is privately owned). 
TVI's Chart of Principles states that the station is a 'private initiative of public 
service' (2nd ¶) and that it will try to be an 'alternative to conventional models' (1st ¶). 
TVI is said to stand for the fundamental values of the Human being and for the 
Humanity's great causes: Freedom, Justice, Peace, Solidarity and Truth (4th ¶). These 
grand ideas committed the Church to the project, and financial and human resources 
were made available to go ahead with the initiative. TVI's problem, however, is that no 
consensus could be found around what a television of 'Christian inspiration' should be, 
in practice. Indeed, TVI did not turn out to be a religious channel, as many in the 
Catholic Church were hoping for, but a commercial and generalist station with some 
religious preoccupations. 
 The TVI's Chart of Principles and grand objectives do not change the fact that 
the station operates, like RTP and SIC, in an extremely difficult financial environment. 
Lacking resources and with only 10% of the television advertising cake, TVI has 
survived with cheap imports and with no investments in home productions. Taking the 
week from the 14th of January 1995 to the 20th of January 1995, TVI scheduled five 
different Latin American telenovelas, four daily and one at the week-end. During the 
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week, at peak-time, the news bulletin was normally followed by a Brazilian telenovela 
and by a US series. Later in the evening, the programming varied from movies 
(generally American) to quizzes and reality shows such as Amigos para Sempre 
(Friends for Ever). During this week, one could not find television genres like 
documentaries, political debates, investigative journalism programmes, or indeed 
national series or drama. TVI's chairman, Roberto Carneiro, regrets the fact that the 
station cannot afford more national production. 'I would like to invest in national fiction 
to fight the ultra-dependency on Brazilian telenovelas. I believe that the set of values (or 
indeed lack of values) they entail are not healthy for the country' (interview:11.01.95). 
In terms of external relations, one of TVI's most relevant partners is the 
Spanish TV channel, Antena 3, which has 2.5% of the capital. In addition to being share 
holder, Antena 3 has been exporting programmes and formats, and has been providing 
assistance in terms of technical know-how and training of personnel. TVI has also a 
commercial relationship with all US majors (Time Warner, Columbia, Disney, etc.) and 
with British TV companies. From the US, the main products acquired are movies and 
light entertainment. Within Latin America, TVI buys mainly telenovelas from Brazil 
(Bandeirantes, Serviço Brasileiro de Televisão, TV Cultura), from Mexico (Televisa) 
and from Venezuela (Venevision). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Because political concerns and public debate were concentrated on who should 
get the channels, all crucial issues associated with the introduction of competition in the 
broadcasting sector were neglected. The Television Act does not reflect any serious 
preoccupation with the financing of the channels, and balanced programming and 
national production were ignored. Without an effective regulatory regime or a 
programme regulator, the outcome of the opening up of the market could not have been 
more predictable. The financial hardship that all broadcasting companies are facing has 
led them to opt for cheap fiction and populist programmes based on foreign formats. 
As the national television system operates quite independently from the EU 
political and cultural influence, the main beneficiaries of the opening up of the 
Portuguese broadcasting market have been the US and Brazil. Indeed, these countries 
have competitive advantages and can afford a sustainable level of investment which 
makes their television products very attractive in economic terms. However, the lack of 
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investment in national production and the systematic acquisition of cheap poor quality 
imports is only possible because, at national level, nothing was done to counterbalance 
the economic logic of television broadcasting. In addition from being asphyxiated by 
financial constraints, both public service and commercial television have no effective 
legal restraints and, consequently, programming is unconditionally designed to 
maximise audiences. Politicians and other actors involves in the setting up of the new 
framework knew little about programming and were far more concerned with 
political/ideological power than with the economic and cultural consequences of this 
venture. 
CECS   Pág. 17 de 20 
Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade   www.cecs.uminho.pt 
Helena Sousa   Portuguese television policy in the international context: 
   an analysis of the links with the EU, Brazil and the US 
Bibliography 
 
 
Baumol, W.J. and W.G. Bowen (1976) 'On the performing arts: the anatomy of their 
economic problems' in M. Blaugh (ed.) The Economics of the Arts, Oxford, Martin 
Robertson. 
 
Blumler,  Jay G. (1993) 'Meshing Money with Mission: Purity versus Pragmatism in 
Public Broadcasting' in European Journal of Communications, vol.8. 
 
Collins, Richard. et al. (1987) The Economics of Television. The UK Case, London, 
Sage. 
 
Collins, Richard (1994) Broadcasting and Audio-visual Policy in the European Single 
Market, London, John Libbey. 
 
Commission of the European Communities (1984) Television Without Frontiers: Green 
Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting Especially by 
Satellite and Cable, (COM (84) 300 final), Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities, Luxembourg. 
 
Commission of the European Communities (1994) Strategy Options to Strengthen the 
European Programme Industry in the Context of the Audiovisual Policy in the European 
Union - Green Paper (COM (94) 96 final), Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities. 
 
Council of the European Communities (1989) Directive on the Coordination of certain 
Provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative action in Member States  
concerning the pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities (89/552/EEC; OJ L 
298,17.10.1989). 
 
Galtung (1971) 'A Structural theory of Imperialism' in Journal of Peace Research, 
vol.13, nº2. 
 
Garnham, Nicholas (1990) Capitalism and Communication - Global Culture and the 
Economic of Information, London, Sage. 
CECS   Pág. 18 de 20 
Centro de Estudos de Comunicação e Sociedade   www.cecs.uminho.pt 
Helena Sousa   Portuguese television policy in the international context: 
   an analysis of the links with the EU, Brazil and the US 
Kucinski, Bernardo (1994) 'Big, bigger, biggest' in Index on Censorship, 4/5. 
 
Locksley, Gareth (1988), TV Broadcasting in Europe and the New Technologies, 
Brussels, CEC. 
 
Locksley, Gareth (1989) 'TV Business in Europe, The Big Picture' in Novell-Smith (ed.) 
The European Experience, London, BFI. 
 
Media Desk (1993) Programa de Apoios Media ao Audiovisual Português, Lisbon, 
Media Desk (booklet). 
 
Media Desk (1993a) Apoios do Programa Media, Lisbon, Media Desk (unpublished 
data). 
 
Media Desk (1994) Apoios do Programa Media, Lisbon, Media Desk (unpublished 
data). 
 
Media Desk (1995) Apoios do Programa Media, Lisbon, Media Desk (unpublished 
data). 
 
Presidência do Conselho de Ministros (1992) Atribuição dos Novos Canais de 
Televisão, Press release, 6 February 1992. 
 
Traquina, Nelson (1995) 'Portuguese television: the politics of savage deregulation in 
Media, Culture and Society, vol.17. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974) 'The rise and future demise of the world capitalist 
system: concepts for comparative analysis' in Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, vol.16, nº16, nº4. 
 
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1979) The Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
                                           
NOTES 
 
iThese figures are based in the examination of one week of Portuguese television programming (5-12 
April 1993). 
iiThe broadcasting commodity might be understood as the total set of audience needs which broadcasting 
attempts to satisfy and the historically given set of productive resources which the broadcasting industry 
has at its disposal for the fulfilment of that task (Collins et al., 1987:6). 
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iii W. J. Baumol was the first economist to study the impact of the production costs in the cultural 
industries. He argued that performing arts were predestined to be victims of a cost disease because the 
costs of these labour intensive industries would continue to increase while, due to technological advances, 
production in manufacturing industries would continue to decrease (Baumol and Bowen, 1976). 
ivDumping is usually taken to mean a product exported at below domestic prices. 
vRegular broadcasts started on the 6th of October 1992. 
viGlobo is one of the world's largest media monopolies. Its aged and powerful chairperson, Roberto 
Marinho, runs, besides his 50-station radio network, and 85-station TV network (Rede Globo), six of 
which he owns, the Globosat/Net cable television system, operating 26 cable TV channels in Rio de 
Janeiro and São Paulo, the magazine and book publishing house Globo, and Brazil's second-largest 
circulation daily O Globo. Roberto Marinho also owns, alone or in association with municipal authorities, 
1,500 Earth Reception Stations (ERT) or re transmission units, and has substantial stock in major 
advertising agencies and printing plants. Roberto Marinho's career was made under the protection of the 
military regime that took power in 1964 and since then Globo has been instrumental in defeating leftist 
governments. The defeat in 1989 of the Workers Party leader, Luís Inácio da Silva, is the most well 
known example (Kucinski, 1994:52-3). 
viiRegular broadcasts started on the 20th of February 1993, one year after the Council of Ministers granted 
the company a broadcasting license 
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